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Tools for a new climate conversation: A mixed-methods study of language for public 
engagement across the political spectrum 
 
Abstract 
 
Political orientation and ideology are amongst the most significant influences on climate change 
attitudes and responses. Specifically, those with right-of-centre political views are typically less 
concerned and more sceptical about climate change. A significant challenge remains to move 
beyond this ideological impasse and achieve a more open and constructive debate across the 
political spectrum. This paper reports on novel mixed-methods research in the UK to develop and 
test a series of ‘narratives’ to better engage citizens with centre-right political views. Qualitative 
work in Study 1 revealed two particularly promising narratives. The first focused on the idea that 
saving energy is predicated on the ‘conservative’ principle of avoiding waste; the second focused 
on the advantages of ‘Great British Energy’ (based on patriotic support for domestic low-carbon 
technologies). An online experiment in Study 2 with a representative UK sample compared these 
narratives with a more typically left-of-centre narrative focused on the concept of ‘climate justice’ 
with a representative sample of the UK public. Results indicate that the first two narratives elicited 
broad agreement and reduced scepticism amongst centre-right participants, while the ‘climate 
justice’  narrative (which reflects a common environmental message framing) polarised audiences 
along political lines. This research offers clear implications for how climate change communicators 
can move beyond preaching to the converted and initiate constructive dialogue about climate 
change with traditionally disengaged audiences.
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1 Introduction 
 
It is now well-established that political orientation and ideology are amongst the most significant 
influences on public engagement with climate change (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2016; Clayton et al., 
2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Those with right-of-centre political views are typically less 
concerned, more sceptical, and correspondingly less receptive to messages about climate change 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2015; Whitmarsh, 2011; Leviston & Walker, 2011). But while multiple studies 
attest to the ideological impasse that defines climate change communication in many Anglophone 
nations, far fewer have been able to offer evidence on how to promote engagement among citizens 
with right-of-centre political views, or indeed how to design communication and engagement 
programmes that resonate across the political spectrum. 
	
This question is of significant practical importance. Major goals of the international policy 
community (such as legally binding national legislation to limit future carbon dioxide emissions 
in the wake of the Paris United Nations accord; UNFCCC, 2015) are unlikely to be achieved 
without support from across the political spectrum. In the current paper, we describe two studies 
with members of the UK public that explore in greater depth the relationship between political 
conservatism and engagement with climate change. We focus on how different narratives about 
energy and climate change are perceived by members of the public, whether there are ways of 
framing climate change that are more engaging for citizens with centre-right political views, and 
ultimately whether it is possible to use these frames to initiate conversations about climate 
change which are engaging across the political spectrum (Corner, 2013).  
 
This represents a novel contribution to the literature on climate change communication and 
framing by focussing on the UK context, which has taken a leading role in international 
negotiations and has world-leading domestic policy on climate change. Indeed, the UK was the 
first country to implement a climate change policy, committing it to binding carbon emissions 
targets (HM Government, 2008), which have recently been reaffirmed in the Fifth Carbon 
Budget. However, the levels of political and public polarisation over the reality of and responses 
to climate change are higher than in most other countries besides the US (Painter & Ashe, 2012; 
Capstick et al., 2014), and yet there has been far less work conducted in the UK context relative 
to other sceptical Anglophone nations. We therefore test the conclusions of previous (mostly US-
centric) work on framing in a novel cultural context, and seek to develop new insights that could 
be applied in other settings characterised by political polarisation – at a time when the UK is 
facing enormous constitutional change and upheaval as it prepares to leave the European Union. 
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Second, the research is novel in its approach – devising new narratives through qualitative 
discussions with key audiences and testing these through a representative experimental survey in 
order to explore both differences and commonalities across responses in both methodological 
approaches. Many studies develop experimental materials based on a priori (e.g., theoretical) 
assumptions about what language and concepts are appropriate, whereas the current study used a 
primarily bottom-up approach, developing materials by engaging directly with the target 
audience. Finally, its novelty lies in the materials tested, particularly the narrative exploring the 
notion of avoiding waste as a rationale for conserving energy, which has not to our knowledge 
previously been examined despite the acknowledged importance of frugality as a principle 
underlying sustainable lifestyles (Evans & Abrahamse, 2008).    
 
1.1 Values, worldviews, ideology & scepticism about climate change 
Public views about climate change have been subject to extensive empirical and theoretical research, 
and although a range of factors are now understood to influence public engagement, the role of 
values (Schwartz, 1992), worldviews (Douglas, & Wildavsky, 1982) and, as a consequence, political 
ideology are among the key predictors of scepticism and engagement (Corner et al., 2014; Hornsey 
et al., 2016). A value is usually defined as a guiding principle in the life of a person (Schwartz, 
1992), and it is now widely accepted that there are 56 universal values that can be divided into four 
distinct clusters which vary along two basic axes. Those axes are openness to change (including self-
direction and stimulation) versus a desire to conserve/respect tradition (including security and 
conformity); and self-transcendence (including altruism, forgiveness, and loyalty) versus self-
enhancement (including power, ambition and hedonism). Although people possess a range of 
different and partly conflicting values, those who identify strongly with self-enhancing values (e.g. 
materialism, personal ambition) tend not to identify strongly with self-transcending values (e.g. 
benevolence, respect for the environment), and vice-versa (Crompton, 2010). With regards to public 
engagement with environmental issues and climate change, there is clear evidence from this 
research: people who lean more strongly towards self-transcending values, especially altruism, show 
higher concern about environmental issues, are less likely to be sceptical about climate change, and 
are more likely to support environmental policies and engage in sustainable behaviours such as 
recycling and energy consumption (Brown & Kasser 2005; Corner et al., 2014; de Groot & Steg 
2009; Poortinga et al. 2004). 
 
An analogous conception can be found in the cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
According to this approach, people’s orientations towards different societal arrangements are 
impacted by ‘cultural worldviews’ that also vary along two axes. The first axis, ‘hierarchy-
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egalitarianism’, refers to a cultural preference for an equitable division of resources (i.e. irrespective 
of gender, race or religion). The second axis, ‘individualism-communitarianism’, relates to the 
question of whether individual interests should be subordinated to collective ones. Individuals with 
stronger egalitarian and communitarian worldviews tend to perceive climate change as riskier than 
those with individualistic and hierarchical views (Stern et al., 1993). Egalitarian-communitarians also 
perceive a more urgent need for ameliorative action and are typically more supportive of climate 
policies that restrain market freedom (e.g., regulation of industry). In contrast, individualistic and 
hierarchical individuals tend to be more supportive of climate policies that maintain the autonomy of 
the free market (e.g., enhanced nuclear power capacity or geoengineering; Dietz et al., 2005). In 
other words, those who strongly support free markets and the primacy of private ownership but 
oppose governmental influence on the everyday behaviour of individuals are more likely to be 
sceptical about climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011) and the urgent need for its mitigation 
(Zia & Todd, 2010).  
 
Both values and cultural worldviews are determinants of an individual’s political ideology, whether 
expressed through party affiliation or their general political preferences (Goren, 2005). However, 
when dealing with subjects as complex and contested as political ideology, it is difficult to draw 
simple conclusions. Political conservatism means different things in different countries and cultures, 
as does the idea of a political spectrum from ‘left’ to ‘right’ (Aspelund et al., 2013). Nonetheless, 
right-leaning individuals have been shown to be more likely to endorse self-enhancing values 
(Sheldon & Nichols, 2009) and to express worldviews that lean towards individualistic and 
hierarchical perspectives (Kahan et al., 2012). Correspondingly, political conservatism predicts 
scepticism about climate change, particularly but not exclusively in English-speaking countries 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011).  
 
Formalising the reasoning implicit in many of the studies reviewed above, Campbell and Kay (2014) 
described the phenomenon of ‘solution aversion’ among US conservatives, arguing that Republicans’ 
scepticism towards scientific knowledge about climate change and the environment is actually 
explained by a conflict between their ideological values and the most popular solutions to 
environmental problems (rather than the scientific evidence itself). They found climate solutions 
involving government regulation to be especially unpopular among conservative participants. In the 
UK, there is a direct relationship between voting for the Conservative Party and scepticism about 
climate change, suggesting that conservative values seem to be at least as important as environmental 
values in driving scepticism about climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011). As in the US, the usual 
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explanation advanced for this relationship is that there is a conflict between conservative values – in 
particular around free market paradigms and individualism – and policies to tackle climate change 
(Campbell & Kay, 2014). But is it really the case that the values of the centre-right and engagement 
with climate change are inherently incompatible, or is it due to how solutions have to date tended to 
be framed?  
 
1.2 Framing climate change to engage centre-right citizens 
The convergent evidence reviewed above suggests that certain elements of right-of-centre belief 
systems are not a natural fit with the dominant social and cultural understanding of what climate 
change means (Hulme, 2009), and climate and energy policies typically promoted in response to it 
(Campbell & Kay, 2014). For example, one common way in which climate change is framed is as a 
question of social justice, given the disproportionate impacts on poorer countries and communities 
while wealthier countries and individuals are responsible for emitting more carbon (Hulme, 2009). 
However, as Wolsko et al (2016) argue in a recent analysis of US conservatives’ responses to 
differently-framed messages about the environment, “it may not be concern about the environment 
which is primarily being rejected by conservatives, but rather the moral tone of the prevailing 
environmental discourse, in which practising “environmentalism” signifies being unfaithful to one's 
in-group and associated conservative values” (Wolsko et al, 2016). In this section, we briefly review 
the limited evidence offering a constructive response to the challenge posed by the disconnect 
between right-of-centre values and the discourse on climate change.  
 
Firstly, there is some evidence that climate messaging focused on the ‘co-benefits’ of climate 
policies is an effective way of reaching more sceptical citizens. Bain et al. (2012) showed that among 
an audience of climate change ‘deniers’, messages that focused on  the economic and technological 
development that climate policies would bring, were most effective. Myers et al’s (2012) comparison 
of differently-framed messages about climate change action found focussing on public health 
benefits elicited the most positive responses, suggesting shifting the terms of the debate from 
‘concern about climate change’ to ‘concern about public health’ is likely to appeal to audiences 
irrespective of political ideology (Maibach et al, 2010). One UK study (Mocker, 2012) showed 
research participants drawn from a sample of Conservative (i.e., centre-right) voters two versions of 
a video where an actor gave a speech on low-carbon transport. Both videos discussed transport 
problems and the need for electrification and increased use of public transport, cycling, and walking. 
While one version of the video framed these issues around economic concerns, the other discussed 
the issues in the context of the dangers and benefits for community health. The video, which placed 
an emphasis on community health, prompted a greater feeling of empowerment and personal 
 6 
motivation to act on climate change, relative to the video with an economic focus. Other work has 
suggested that framing a pro-environmental message as patriotic, by suggesting that environmental 
conservation can protect the ‘American way of life’, or as ‘morally pure’, whereby environmental 
harm is positioned as a violation of the sanctity of nature, are effective ways of reaching the US right  
on climate change (Feygina et al, 2010; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; cf. Wolsko et al. 2016). 
 
To date, however, little research has explored such framing effects outside of the US. In the UK, it is 
certainly not the case that all forms of political conservatism are inherently in conflict with 
environmental concern or engagement with climate change. British conservatism – on the centre-
right of the political spectrum – has various shades and strands, including an emphasis on 
pragmatism (Adams, 2001), the conservation of cultural institutions and national heritage, and a 
respect for inter-generational duty (Scruton, 2012). Shrubsole (2011) noted several centre-right 
values that could underpin positive engagement with climate change. One example is a concern for 
protecting the British countryside and its aesthetic beauty for future generations. The aesthetic appeal 
of the countryside and the activities and livelihoods it supports are a part of the cultural heritage that 
conservatism seeks to protect. Another is intergenerational duty, expressed by preserving the 
environment for future generations. The idea of the ‘Burkean contract’ (Burke, 1910) between those 
who are living, those who are dead, and those who have not yet been born has been a key part of 
British centre-right thought for over a century (Green, 2004). Similarly, avoiding waste is consistent 
with centre-right values of responsibility and pragmatism (Corner, 2013).   
 
The challenge therefore remains to move beyond the ideological impasse on centre-right 
engagement with climate change and achieve a more open and constructive debate across the 
political spectrum. It seems clear that there are potential overlaps between centre-right values and 
positive engagement with climate change, but this paper is the first direct evidence of how UK 
citizens with centre-right views respond to differently framed ‘narratives’ about climate change. 
In this paper, we particularly focus on ‘centre-right’ ideology in order that the narratives are 
developed with and for a particular target audience. Nevertheless, we recognise that political 
ideology is complex and can be conceptualised in many different ways, so explore responses 
across the ‘left-right’ spectrum (including the far right) and using different ideological indicators 
(e.g., voting behaviour, cultural cognition, Kahan et al., 2012) to provide a broad-based and 
complementary analytical framework for exploring our research questions.  
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There is no single, universal definition of a ‘narrative’, but the term has become increasingly 
common among climate change communication researchers and practitioners (Smith et al., 2014; 
Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2016). Narratives (or stories) are a fundamental tool used by humans to 
make sense of the world and their place within it; they help reduce complexity and provide 
meaning and are applied at every level of society (from institutional discourses to everyday 
accounts; e.g., Abell, 1987). Consequently, their importance as a communication tool is endorsed 
by scholars from across disciplines as diverse as linguistics, psychology and literary theory (e.g., 
Herman, 2013). In contrast to studies of message-framing that typically change a small number of 
words between different experimental treatments (offering close control but arguably less 
ecological validity), this paper explores narratives as clusters of ideas and concepts derived from 
the identified audience (rather than as a fixed format for ‘delivering’ a message). We apply here 
the definition of a narrative as a storyline or narrated text that ‘defines problems, indicates causes 
and possible solutions as well as moral responsibilities’ (Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2016, p.2). 
Consistent with informal modes of story-telling, we also use the first person as narrator. As such, 
we position narratives here as  a particular  type of framing that is holistic (in that our materials 
are designed to capture several complementary  concepts), personal (in that they use a voice that 
speaks directly to participants) and action-oriented (in that we focus on solutions and spell out 
policy implications).  
 
In the following sections, we report on mixed-methods research to develop and test a series of 
narratives to engage UK citizens with centre-right political views. Study 1 (Section 2) was an in-
depth qualitative investigation, involving a series of structured discussion groups with UK centre-
right voters, to identify and trial narratives focusing on different framings of energy and climate 
change designed to resonate with centre-right political values. Study 2 (Section 3) involved an 
online experiment with a nationally representative UK sample to provide a large-scale empirical 
test of two particularly promising narratives, and a comparison traditional ‘green’ narrative 
(hypothesised to appeal only to left-of-centre voters). The paper concludes with implications for 
communication and public engagement with climate change (Section 4). 
 
2 Study 1: Developing the narratives 
 
2.1 Materials & Methods 
Four discussion groups with members of the UK public were conducted in September 2015, 
using the ‘narrative workshop’ method, a format for holding structured discussions used 
successfully in multiple climate change public engagement projects  (Corner & Roberts, 2014; 
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Marshall, 2014). In line with this methodology, the first half of each discussion followed a 
‘funnel’ design from an open, general conversation about participants’ values and views on social 
issues, through more focused conversation about energy and climate change, and into a 
discussion of climate change and political conservatism specifically. The second half of each 
workshop was dedicated to the exploration and discussion of a set of four narratives, designed 
specifically for the project. The narratives (see Appendix 1 for full text) were short pieces of 
written text that used different language to describe climate change, and policies that could be 
employed to address it, designed to speak to different centre-right values and concerns. Four 
narratives were tested: firstly, the idea that ‘avoiding waste is common sense’ (as a justification 
for conserving energy); secondly, the notion of promoting good health and quality of life (as a co-
benefit of more sustainable living); thirdly, a patriotic call for a ‘Great British Energy’ system; 
and fourthly, the notion of ‘the smart money’ being in renewables and clean energy technologies. 
We term these four frames ‘Waste’, ‘The Good Life’, ‘Great British Energy’ and ‘The Smart 
Money’ from this point onwards. .  
 
Recruitment took place using a snowball method through relevant networks associated with 
Conservative Party local constituency offices in two rural (Barcombe and Leominster), and two 
urban (Richmond and Bradford) locations. This provided a ‘convenience’ sample of the 
population we sought to make inferences about (i.e. those with centre-right political views). In 
total, 45 people participated in the research, in groups of between nine and 13 people. Six in ten 
participants were male; 65% were 55 or older, 22% aged between 25-54 and 13% were 18-24 
years old. In terms of ethnicity, 30 of the participants identified as white, five as Asian and one as 
black; nine did not provide this information. Socio-economic backgrounds were mixed; several 
participants were elected local councillors or held other local positions of political office in the 
Conservative Party. Participants were paid for their participation. The workshops were audio-
recorded and transcribed, with analysis proceeding in a two-step process. Firstly, each workshop 
was analysed individually, with particular attention paid to instances of strong reactions (positive 
or negative) to climate change, the tested materials, as well as the values explored in the first part 
of the discussions. Next, a synthesis across all workshops was conducted, to establish conclusions 
that could be drawn from across the full set of workshops (while noting areas of potential 
diversion – e.g. across the rural/urban divide).  
 
2.2 Results 
The four groups generated a large amount of rich data, including evidence of how centre-right 
views and values related to attitudes towards climate change and possible responses to it. These 
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data are analysed in greater detail elsewhere (Corner et al, 2016); here, we focus exclusively on 
the second half of the workshops, where the four narratives were explored and evaluated. 
 
2.2.1 – Narrative 1: Waste 
This was consistently the most popular narrative. It was perceived as reflecting several core 
centre-right values - pragmatism, responsibility and common sense - and the idea that it is 
irresponsible to waste things (from food, to resources, to energy) resonated strongly with 
participants. In part, the strength of this narrative derived from the fact that, unprompted, several 
participants (in different groups) had used very similar language themselves in describing their 
views earlier in the discussion groups. Of all the narratives, it seemed to provide the closest fit 
with a centre-right worldview, and even among participants sceptical about climate change, the 
logic of avoiding waste was not rejected: 
 
“There’s not much there I would argue about. I’m of a certain generation. My mother’s generation 
wouldn’t waste anything and I wouldn’t want to see things wasted” (Male, Barcombe) 
 
It also seemed to transcend the sense of ‘political correctness’ that plagues the issue of climate 
change for many on the right of the political spectrum: 
 
“Beyond this [climate change] is the real principle at stake here about how flagrantly we are using the 
Earth’s resources in this appalling way and not considering future generations... allowing them to inherit 
these problems...we don’t need to use as much as we do” (Female, Barcombe) 
 
While the narrative was generally well-received, certain elements were challenged. For example, 
participants in Bradford felt that reference to avoiding littering would not work well in inner city 
neighbourhoods where fly-tipping is a constant problem; while many refuted the claim that 
progress is being made with recycling and excess packaging.  
 
2.2.2 Narrative 2: The Good Life 
This narrative received a mixed response. On the one hand, the central idea of linking leaky 
homes and ‘dirty’ forms of fossil fuel energy to worse health outcomes attracted mostly positive 
reactions: 
 
“As a care manager I’ve been into plenty of homes where especially the elderly who own their own homes 
haven’t had the money to do them up and keep them up and don’t have any heating and it is one of the 
main factors to why they’re dying” (Female, Leominster) 
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There was some acknowledgment that bringing climate change closer to people’s everyday lives 
through issues such as ‘the air we breathe’ was a viable strategy for making it more 
understandable: “Being able to link climate change immediately with your life is quite key” (Male, 
Richmond) 
 
However, especially among some of the older participants, there was doubt that air pollution was 
still a significant issue, with some remembering first hand the much worse conditions in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century. And some (older) participants dismissed the idea that the elderly were 
particularly vulnerable, preferring to see cold houses as a proof of the traditional virtue of 
hardiness: 
 
“Officially I’m elderly and I live in an old and draughty home and I’ve worked hard all my life and I’m 
not miserable” (Male, Leominster) 
 
This provides further evidence that age is an important factor to consider when engaging centre-
right audiences, and also speaks to the consistent underlying theme of climate change campaigns 
lacking credibility and authenticity. Crucially, it also suggests that the concept of ‘fuel poverty’ is 
not uncritically accepted among this audience. In two of the four groups this narrative was 
identified as sounding especially unsuitable for centre-right audiences: 
 
“Talking about people that deserve better is typical left language” (Female, Barcombe) 
 
Another way in which the credibility of this narrative was challenged was doubt over the statistic 
on excess winter deaths. This was partly because the source of the figures was unacknowledged 
(and so attributed to climate change campaigners even though the source was the government-
funded Office for National Statistics), and partly because of the mention of the British Medical 
Association (BMA), to which many participants attributed politicised motives. There was also 
consistent rejection of the idea that social issues (such as vandalism and crime) should be 
associated with environmental issues and climate change. 
 
2.2.3 Narrative 3: Great British Energy 
One key concept in this narrative - that local democracy is (or should be) the backbone of Britain 
- was strongly supported across all four groups. However, whilst there was broad support for 
involving local communities more actively in decision-making about energy infrastructure, there 
was also a sense across the groups that energy policy was something that needed to be driven by 
national decision-making: 
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“Well that’s a really powerful argument isn’t it, to say ‘well if you, as a local community, don’t want this 
form of energy then what do you want? It’s in your hands’” (Female, Richmond) 
 
The contrast drawn in the narrative between living with a wind turbine or a fracking well was 
roundly rejected as a legitimate choice, with several participants stridently answering that they 
would prefer to live near a fracking well.  
 
“People need to consider local concerns as there will be opposition to all energy projects. I think shale 
gas and wind farm concerns are almost one and the same. It’s not the source of energy that is being 
produced, it’s the disruption and the risks to housing for those local people” (Male, Richmond) 
 
2.2.4 Narrative 4: The Smart Money 
This was consistently the least favoured narrative.  Most of the groups expressed doubts about the 
true motivations of big business. While the idea that decarbonising made ‘good business sense’ 
was positively received, the inclusion of corporations (Ikea, Unilever, M&S) in the narrative was 
unpopular. These organisations were not seen as particularly trusted messengers and there was a 
consistent sense that they were primarily motivated by their public reputation and profits (and, on 
the same principle, that government supported renewables in order to increase its revenue). 
For some participants the very term ‘smart money’ suggested ‘self-interested fat cats’ and the 
feeling that ‘I’ll end up paying more for it’. 
 
“These companies will take it seriously up to a point but they are enormously greedy... it’s all to make 
money” (Female, Leominster) 
 
As we found with the ‘big numbers’ in the health narrative (regarding extra winter deaths from 
cold homes), the figures in this narrative were repeatedly challenged and doubted, in particular 
the idea that renewables are now a ‘smart investment’.  The figures in fact came from an article 
by a prominent conservative, Ben Caldecott. However, because the source was not referenced, 
the figures were automatically assumed to come from an unreliable source such as a solar panel 
company or a campaigning organisation. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
Study 1 represents the first empirical exploration of language and narratives designed specifically 
to engage UK citizens with centre-right views more effectively on climate change, and some 
clear patterns emerged. Firstly – and cutting across several of the tested narratives – the notion of 
authenticity appeared to be at the forefront of participants’ judgments, with doubts raised about 
the credibility of both sources of information and statistics. This suggests that the dramatic claims 
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frequently made by campaigners about climate risks, although scientifically justified, may be 
counterproductive in terms of engaging this audience. Secondly, there were clear preferences for 
certain narratives (or at least concepts within them), with the idea of avoiding wastefulness and 
nurturing home-grown energy production both receiving largely positive evaluations from most 
participants. Thirdly, some concepts that previous literature has suggested ought to be effective in 
engaging this audience did not fare particularly well. In particular, elements of the narrative 
focused on the health benefits of energy-saving (The Good Life) were not particularly well-
received (cf. Myers et al., 2012), and neither were the claims about the benefits of investing in 
renewable energy technologies in the ‘Smart Money’ narrative (cf. Bain et al., 2012). In both 
cases, there were doubts about the credibility of the claims – either because of a distrusted source 
(e.g., the trade union BMA) or financial figures that were perceived as hyperbolic. It is interesting 
that discourses that repeatedly emerge in studies of environmental attitudes amongst the general 
public were evident here, too, within this sub-group; in particular, a sense that natural resources 
should be protected and that ‘big business’ is untrustworthy (e.g., Wolf & Moser, 2011). This 
provides further indications that there may be unifying narratives that appeal across the political 
spectrum. 
 
These findings provide a valuable and indicative sense of the way in which four different 
narratives about energy and climate change – all potentially congruent with centre-right belief 
systems – were engaged with by a centre-right audience. However, as with all qualitative work of 
this nature, it is not possible to make statistically robust extrapolations based on a sample of this 
size (and indeed with a rather older than average demographic). Study 2 therefore picked up two 
of the narratives that received a positive reception in Study 1 and explored them further, but using 
a nationally representative sample in an online experiment.   
   
3 Study 2: Testing the narratives 
 
Study 2 employed a representative UK public sample and compared adapted versions of the 
Waste and Great British Energy (henceforth ‘British’) narratives with a more typically left-of-
centre narrative focused on the concept of ‘climate justice’ (‘Justice’). These two narratives were 
selected as they received the strongest support in Study 1. While elements of ‘The Good Life’ 
narrative were well-received, other aspects were not; in addition, while health-framing has been 
explored in previous studies (e.g., Myers et al., 2012), the concepts in the Waste and British 
narratives have not. This allowed us not only to test how well the new narratives worked to 
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engage the centre-right participants within a representative sample, but also to establish their 
resonance amongst voters from across the political spectrum.  
 
3.1 Materials & Methods 
3.1.1 Design 
An online experiment was designed to test the Waste and British narratives, and compare these 
with the Justice narrative. A fourth control condition presented advice on how to safely change a 
car tyre (‘Control’). The design was between-subjects, with participants randomly assigned to 
one of the four conditions. All participants provided demographic information and voting 
intention, read the text, and then completed all dependent variables (DVs) and independent 
variables (IVs) and covariates.    
 
3.1.2 Participants 
Participants (N=2,088) were recruited from an online research panel (Qualtrics) in December 
2015 using a quota sample
1
. The quotas were nationally representative of the UK public in 
respect of gender, age, and ethnicity (according to census data), as well as voting intention 
(according to the most recent national election, in 2015). A demographic breakdown is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics 
  % 
 
  % 
Country 
England 85.7 
 
Voting 
intention 
Would not vote 2.1 
Wales 4.2 
 
Conservative 37.1 
Scotland 8.9 
 
Labour 30.6 
Northern Ireland 1.2 
 
Liberal Democrats 8 
  
  
Scottish National Party (SNP) 4.2 
Age 
16-24 13 
 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 12.7 
25-34 16.2 
 
Green 3.8 
35-44 17.1 
 
Other / Prefer not to say 1.5 
45-54 17.7 
 
  
 55-64 15 
 
Highest 
qualification 
No formal qualifications 5.2 
65+ 21 
 
GCSE / O-Level 20.7 
  
  
A-Level / Higher / BTEC 19.9 
Gender 
Female 50.6 
 
Vocational / NVQ 14.2 
Male 49.3 
 
Undergraduate degree 27 
Other 0.1 
 
Postgraduate degree 13 
																																																								
1
 Although the sample was not a proportional random sample, in order to minimize the risk of bias, the survey 
company uses a three-stage randomisation process in matching a participant with a survey they are likely to be able 
to complete. First, participants are randomly selected from the panel to be invited to take a survey, and these 
participants are combined with others entering another sampling platform after responding to online messaging. A 
set of profiling questions is randomly selected for them to answer and upon completion, participants are matched 
with a survey they are likely to be able to take, using a further element of randomisation.  
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Ethnicity 
Black (e.g., Black Caribbean, Black African) 2.6 
 Rurality 
Urban 36.1 
White 90.7 
 
Sub-urban 42.7 
Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani, Chinese) 4.5 
 
Rural 21.2 
Mixed (e.g., White & Asian, White & Black) 2 
 
  
 Other 0.2 
 
  
 Prefer not to answer 0.1 
 
  
 
 
   
  
 3.1.3 Materials 
Participants in all four conditions were presented with an introduction to the text they were asked 
to read to increase credibility and ensure elaboration: “Please read the following recent letter to 
the Editor of a UK broadsheet newspaper carefully as you will be asked a number of questions 
about it afterwards.” 
 
One of the narratives was then presented (full texts in Appendix 2). The ‘Waste’ narrative 
referred to avoiding waste as ‘common sense’ and those living in drafty homes as ‘throwing 
energy away’. The rationale provided for climate change action was ‘avoiding waste, conserving 
energy, and finding a way of doing more with less’. The ‘Great British Energy’ narrative stated 
‘decisions about energy technologies should be taken by the British people’ and referred to 
‘producing our own energy, through British-made solar and wind technologies’. Climate change 
action was framed in terms of ‘supporting British manufacturing and technology, and creating 
more green jobs’. Finally, the ‘Justice’ narrative stated ‘the poorest people in the world are the 
ones who will suffer the most from the impacts of climate change, but they’ve done the least to 
cause it’ and advocated ‘those with more resources do more to tackle climate change’. All of the 
experimental texts concluded ‘That’s why I agree that the government should sign up to an 
international agreement to tackle climate change, and I think the people of Britain have a role to 
play in making changes to our own lifestyles to reduce our impact on the environment’ followed 
by a short sentence summarising the underpinning narrative principle.  
 
Finally, the Control condition presented advice on changing a car tyre. The length of the article 
(159 words) was matched to the experimental conditions, and there were no references made to 
climate or energy (e.g., “Given a safe environment, the right tools and some basic knowledge, 
changing a wheel on any vehicle should be fairly straightforward…”). 
 
3.1.4 Measures 
Following the text, participants were asked, “Now please spend a couple of minutes thinking 
about what you’ve just read. What thoughts came to mind when you were reading the letter?” 
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(open-ended) to ensure elaboration. A manipulation check then followed which confirmed that 
participants had read the text (see Appendix 3).  
 
Two DVs related to responses to the article. First, agreement with the article was measured with 
five items, measured on a seven-point scale (7=completely agree to 1=completely disagree) 
including: ‘I do not agree with what the letter was saying’ (reverse scored), ‘The issues raised in 
the letter are important to me’, ‘The letter made a very persuasive argument’. The items formed a 
reliable scale (α(5)=.80). Second, reactance to the article was measured with three items drawn 
from previous identity threat research (e.g., Witte et al., 1998), again measured on a seven-point 
agreement scale including: ‘The problems described in the letter were exaggerated’, ‘The letter 
was trying to manipulate my feelings’ (α(3)=.77). 
 
The remaining six DVs included climate change perceptions and responses: 
-  Policy support focussed on the two policies proposed in the articles: (a) government action, and 
(b) lifestyle change; each was measured with on a five-point scale (Strongly support to 
Strongly oppose): ‘Please indicate how much you support or oppose the following… The UK 
government signing up to an international agreement to tackle climate change’ and ‘British 
people making changes to their lifestyles to reduce their impact on the environment’.  
 -  Climate change concern was measured with one item (from, e.g., Spence et al., 2011): ‘How 
concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, which is sometimes referred to as ‘global 
warming?’ on a four-point scale (‘very concerned’ to ‘not at all concerned’) with a ‘don’t 
know’ option (removed for analysis). 
 -  Risk perception was measured with four items on a five-point scale from ‘extremely serious’ to 
‘not at all serious’ (from Capstick et al., 2015): ‘How serious a threat, if at all, is climate 
change to each of the following? You and your family, The UK as a whole, People in 
developing countries, Wildlife and ecosystems (α(4)=.89). 
 -  Climate scepticism was measured with six items (derived from Whitmarsh et al., 2015) on a 
five-point agreement scale including: ‘Claims that human activities are changing the climate 
are exaggerated’, ‘There is too much conflicting evidence about climate change to know 
whether it is actually happening’, ‘I am convinced that climate change is really happening’ 
(reversed) (α(6)=.91). 
 -  Willingness to act was measured on a seven-point willingness scale (extremely willing to not 
at all willing) with six items (from Capstick et al., 2015) intended to reflect both consumer and 
citizen actions: ‘Change to a ‘green’ energy supplier’, ‘Cut down the amount you travel by 
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car’, ‘Buy appliances that are more energy-efficient’, ‘Reduce the amount of energy you use at 
home’, ‘Write letters, email, or phone your local MP about climate change’, and ‘Sign a 
petition about climate change, either online or in person’ (α(6)=.87). 
 
We included a number of conceptually complementary variables to establish the political 
orientation of participants. Political ideology was measured with the item: ‘In politics people 
sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using the scale below, where would you place yourself on 
the political spectrum?’ measured on an 11-point scale from Left (0) to Right (10). For the 
purposes of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVAs), we created three equal-sized groups, 
which effectively represent: left-wing and centrist (0-5), centre-right (6), and (far) right (7-10). 
Political ideology was used as an IV, along with experimental condition, in the analysis
2
.  
 
Two covariates – cultural cognition and pro-environmental identity – were included also included 
as these have been found, along with demographic measures, to predict climate change attitudes 
and responses in previous research (e.g., Whitmarsh, 2011; Hornsey et al., 2016). First, cultural 
cognition was measured with a six-point agreement scale adapted from Kahan et al. (2011; Lord 
et al., in prep) and comprising five items in the Hierarchism sub-scale (α(5)=.50) including: ‘If 
things keep going the way they are, soon ethnic minorities will have more rights than the 
majority’, ‘The wife or female partner should have primary responsibility for childcare’. The 
Individualism sub-scale comprised four items (α(4)=.62) including: ‘The government tries to 
control people’s behaviour too much’, ‘The government needs to place certain limits on freedom 
of speech for the benefit of society as a whole’ (reversed). Pro-environmental identity was 
measured with three items (see Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010) on a five-point agreement scale 
including: ‘Being environmentally-friendly is an important part of who I am’, ‘I think of myself 
as someone who is very concerned about environmental issues’ (α(3)=.67). 
 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 MANOVAs 
MANOVAs showed that political ideology had a significant main effect for all DVs (Table 2). 
Specifically, those with left-wing political ideology showed highest agreement with the 
																																																								
2
 We also explored the role of voting intention and cultural cognition as IVs, instead of political ideology. The 
former analysis showed results consistent with the ideology analysis, but categorising political parties into ‘left-right’ 
was problematic since most political scientists agree that parties differ along multiple dimensions (e.g., Kahan et al., 
2012). The Cultural cognition measures used here showed some main effects (again, consistent with the ideology 
analysis), but no significant interactions. Given the lower reliability of these measures, and the more straightforward 
operationalization of political ideology, we selected this as IV for the remaining analysis.    
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experimental articles, climate change concern, risk perception, support for government action and 
lifestyle change, and willingness to act; and lowest reactance and climate scepticism.  
 
Table 2. MANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (significant effects are shown in bold) 
 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
η2 
Left-right ideology 
(3 groups) 
  
  
Article agreement 51.85 2.00 25.93 15.95 0.00 0.02 
Article reactance 118.30 2.00 59.15 29.15 0.00 0.03 
Climate change concern 63.48 2.00 31.74 25.64 0.00 0.02 
Risk perception 38.74 2.00 19.37 24.92 0.00 0.02 
Climate scepticism 154.90 2.00 77.45 79.46 0.00 0.07 
Support for government action 71.45 2.00 35.72 31.78 0.00 0.03 
Support for lifestyle change 31.11 2.00 15.55 16.01 0.00 0.02 
Willingness to act 126.82 2.00 63.41 36.47 0.00 0.03 
Experimental 
condition 
  
Article agreement 51.86 3.00 17.29 10.64 0.00 0.02 
Article reactance 138.87 3.00 46.29 22.81 0.00 0.03 
Climate change concern 0.72 3.00 0.24 0.19 0.90 0.00 
Risk perception 4.96 3.00 1.65 2.13 0.10 0.00 
Climate scepticism 1.86 3.00 0.62 0.64 0.59 0.00 
Support for government action 2.59 3.00 0.86 0.77 0.51 0.00 
Support for lifestyle change 6.09 3.00 2.03 2.09 0.10 0.00 
Willingness to act 1.19 3.00 0.40 0.23 0.88 0.00 
Ideology x 
condition 
  
Article agreement 79.21 6.00 13.20 8.12 0.00 0.02 
Article reactance 54.26 6.00 9.04 4.46 0.00 0.01 
Climate change concern 7.65 6.00 1.28 1.03 0.40 0.00 
Risk perception 4.44 6.00 0.74 0.95 0.46 0.00 
Climate scepticism 14.93 6.00 2.49 2.55 0.02 0.01 
Support for government action 4.88 6.00 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.00 
Support for lifestyle change 11.29 6.00 1.88 1.94 0.07 0.01 
Willingness to act 7.37 6.00 1.23 0.71 0.65 0.00 
 
 
Post-hoc analyses (Table 3) using Bonferonni correction showed all ideology groups differed 
significantly from one another in respect of the DVs, with only two exceptions: left and centre-
right did not significantly differ on article reactance; and centre-right and (far) right groups were 
only marginally significantly different for support for lifestyle change. Effect sizes, however, are 
small in general, with climate scepticism showing the largest effect (partial η2 = .07). 
 
In respect of experimental condition, responses to the articles differed significantly (Table 4). 
Specifically, Waste (M=4.91, SD=1.30) elicited the highest agreement overall, followed by 
British (M=4.81, SD=1.33), then Justice (M=4.68, SD=1.40) and Control (M=4.50, SD=1.15). In 
terms of statistical significance, Waste was significantly preferred to Justice; while Justice was no 
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more preferred than our Control text (changing a car tyre). Article reactance was significantly 
higher for all experimental texts – Waste (M=3.77, SD=1.47), British (M=3.82, SD=1.50), and 
Justice (M=3.88, SD=1.48) – than for the Control text (M=3.21, SD=1.38). In other words, 
respondents felt all climate change narratives were significantly more exaggerated, strained the 
truth more, and manipulated their feelings more, than a non-climate change message.   
 
Table 3. Differences between ideology groups on article responses and climate change 
perceptions/responses (post-hoc analyses)  
 
DV (I) Ideology (I) Mean (SD) (J) Ideology Mean Difference (I-J) 
Article agreement 
Left 4.95 (1.32) Centre-right .23*** 
Centre-right 4.72 (1.23) (Far) right -.18* 
(Far) right 4.54 (1.33) Left -.41*** 
Article reactance 
Left 3.41 (1.43) Centre-right -0.14 
Centre-right 3.55 (1.39) (Far) right .43*** 
(Far) right 3.98 (1.54) Left .57*** 
Climate change concern 
Left 3.14 (.77) Centre-right .21*** 
Centre-right 2.93 (.79) (Far) right -.14*** 
(Far) right 2.79 (.88) Left -.35*** 
Risk perception 
Left 3.97 (.80) Centre-right .18*** 
Centre-right 3.79 (.86) (Far) right -.18* 
(Far) right 3.61 (.96) Left -.35*** 
Climate scepticism 
Left 2.36 (1.01) Centre-right -.37*** 
Centre-right 2.73 (.95) (Far) right .30*** 
(Far) right 3.03 (1.01) Left .67*** 
Support for government action 
Left 4.26 (.97) Centre-right .31*** 
Centre-right 3.96 (1.00) (Far) right -.16** 
(Far) right 3.80 (1.17) Left -.47*** 
Support for lifestyle change 
Left 4.21 (.93) Centre-right .20*** 
Centre-right 4.01 (.95) (Far) right -0.11(*) 
(Far) right 3.90 (1.05) Left -.31*** 
Willingness to act 
Left 5.25 (1.29) Centre-right .41*** 
Centre-right 4.84 (1.27) (Far) right -.20** 
(Far) right 4.65 (1.37) Left -.61*** 
(*) p=.08, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001  
   
 
Table 4. Differences between narratives on article responses and climate change 
perceptions/responses (post-hoc analyses)  
 
DV (I) Narrative (I) Mean (SD) (J) Narrative Mean Difference (I-J) 
Article agreement Waste 4.91 (1.30) 
British 0.11 
Justice .23* 
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British 4.81 (1.33) 
Justice 0.13 
Control .31*** 
Justice 4.68 (1.40) Control 0.18 
Control 4.50 (1.15) Waste -.41*** 
Article reactance 
Waste 3.77 (1.47) 
British -0.06 
Justice -0.11 
British 3.82 (1.50) 
Justice -0.05 
Control .62*** 
Justice 3.88 (1.48) Control .67*** 
Control 3.21 (1.38) Waste -.56*** 
Climate change concern 
Waste 2.93 (.83) 
British -0.03 
Justice 0.00 
British 2.96 (.83) 
Justice 0.03 
Control 0.01 
Justice 2.93 (.85) Control -0.02 
Control 2.95 (.81) Waste 0.02 
Risk perception 
Waste 3.79 (.88) 
British -0.05 
Justice 0.09 
British 3.84 (.89) 
Justice 0.14 
Control 0.06 
Justice 3.70 (.91) Control -0.08 
Control 3.78 (.89) Waste -0.01 
Climate scepticism 
Waste 2.72 (1.01) 
British 0.00 
Justice -0.06 
British 2.72 (1.05) 
Justice -0.06 
Control 0.03 
Justice 2.79 (1.06) Control 0.10 
Control 2.69 (1.00) Waste -0.03 
Support for government policy 
Waste 3.95 (1.09) 
British -0.09 
Justice -0.04 
British 4.03 (1.07) 
Justice 0.05 
Control 0.03 
Justice 3.98 (1.12) Control -0.02 
Control 4.00 (1.02) Waste 0.06 
Support for lifestyle change 
Waste 4.05 (.99) 
British -0.04 
Justice 0.11 
British 4.09 (1.00) 
Justice 0.15 
Control 0.03 
Justice 3.94 (1.04) Control -0.12 
Control 4.05 (.94) Waste 0.01 
Willingness to act 
Waste 4.92 (1.35) 
British 0.00 
Justice 0.07 
British 4.93 (1.39) 
Justice 0.07 
Control 0.05 
Justice 4.85 (1.31) Control -0.02 
Control 4.89 (1.31) Waste -0.04 
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There were also significant, but weak, interaction effects in the case of three DVs (article 
agreement, reactance and scepticism) and one marginal effect (p=0.07) for support for lifestyle 
change. Figures 1-4 show these interactions, which reveal that Waste, and to a lesser extent 
British, elicited broad agreement across ideology groups; while Justice polarised groups, with 
left-wing respondents showing highest agreement, and (far) right groups showing least. The 
opposite pattern was evident for article reactance, with Waste and British narratives showing 
similar responses (though rather higher for (far) right respondents), and Justice polarising opinion 
((far) right having highest reactance and left-wing having lowest). Scepticism and support for 
lifestyle change again showed some convergence across groups for Waste and most polarisation 
for Justice. It is interesting to note that the centre-right group appears sometimes to be positioned 
closer to (far) right respondents (e.g., in responses to the Justice narrative) and sometimes closer 
to left-wing respondents (e.g., in responses to the British narrative). This draws attention to the 
fluidity of these categories, which we address in the next sub-section.  
 
Figures 1-4. Interactions between narratives and political ideology (error bars +/- 1 SD) 
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3.2.2 Regression analyses 
Since MANOVA requires using categorical variables for IVs, this risks losing variance in the 
political ideology scale. Step-wise regression analyses were therefore conducted on all eight DVs, 
with political ideology entered as a continuous variable with experimental condition as dummy 
variables, and interaction terms also entered. Demographics, voting intention, pro-environmental 
identity and cultural cognition were entered as covariates.  
 
This analysis (see Appendix 4) found that pro-environmental identity, cultural cognition, voting 
intention, and some demographics (particularly gender) show effects across most or all DVs. There 
were some significant effects of ideology, specifically for article agreement and climate scepticism. 
Condition was a significant predictor in several cases: agreement was significantly higher for all 
experimental conditions compared to the control text; reactance was lower for the Justice text; while 
the British narrative reduced support for lifestyle change.  
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Of most relevance, interactions were confirmed as significant between condition and ideology for 
agreement (Waste β=-.24, t(2087) =-3.70, p<.001; British β =-.30, t(2087) =-4.51, p<.001; 
Justice β=-.46, t(2087) =-6.99, p<.001), reactance (Waste β=.19, t(2087) =2.73, p<.01; British 
β=.14, t(2087) =1.98, p<.05; Justice β=.34, t(2087) =4.92, p<.001), lifestyle change (British 
β=.18, t(2087) =2.84, p<.01), and marginally for risk perception (0.07; British β=.11, t(2087) 
=1.82, p=.07). Specifically, agreement was lowest and reactance highest for right-wing 
respondents reading the Justice narrative (with agreement highest for the Waste narrative); while 
right-wing respondents were more likely to support lifestyle change (and see climate change as a 
risk) when reading the British narrative. This was broadly consistent with our MANOVA 
findings, although the interaction between ideology and condition was no longer significant for 
climate scepticism. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Study 2 found small but distinct preferences among participants for different narratives. While 
the ‘Waste’ narrative elicited broad agreement amongst participants across the political spectrum, 
the ‘Justice’ narrative was significantly less appealing, and indeed polarised participants along 
political lines. Controlling for pro-environmental identity, voting intention and demographics, 
right-wing respondents were most likely to agree with the ‘Waste’ narrative and most likely to 
support lifestyle change (and – marginally – to see climate change as a risk) when reading the 
‘Great British Energy’ narrative. Not only do these findings provide quantitative support for the 
patterns observed in Study 1, they suggest that narratives which are more engaging for centre-
right audiences are also not disengaging for members of the public from across the political 
spectrum. However, reactance among right-leaning participants was higher for all narratives than 
for a non-climate change message. That is, all of the narratives produced an elevated sense of 
exaggeration or hyperbole among right-wing participants, relative to the control condition, 
suggesting a general anti-climate messaging response, and representing a significant challenge 
for climate change communication practitioners seeking to engage this audience.  
 
4 General discussion & conclusions 
 
To date, little work has examined how to promote public engagement with climate change across the 
political spectrum, despite clear evidence that political orientation and ideology are very strong 
influences on climate change attitudes and responses (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2016). This paper reported 
on novel mixed-methods research in the UK to develop and test a series of narratives to engage 
citizens with centre-right political views. Qualitative work with centre-right voters revealed two 
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particularly promising narratives: the first focused on the idea that saving energy is predicated on the 
‘conservative’ principle of avoiding waste (‘Waste’); the second focused on the advantages of ‘Great 
British Energy’ (based on domestic low-carbon technologies). An online experiment with a 
representative sample compared these narratives with a more typically left-of-centre narrative 
focused on the concept of ‘Climate Justice’ with a representative sample of the UK public.  
 
While the ‘Waste’ narrative elicited broad agreement amongst centre-right participants in Study 1, 
and across the political spectrum in Study 2, the ‘Justice’ narrative tested in Study 2 polarised 
participants along political lines, offering a clear indication for language to use and avoid, for 
practitioners seeking to initiate constructive dialogue about climate change across the British 
political spectrum. These findings also suggest that narratives which more effectively engage centre-
right audiences will not necessarily ‘turn off’ members of the public from across the political 
spectrum – a novel and practically important result. There was also some evidence that the ‘Great 
British Energy’ narrative was more likely to lead to support for lifestyle change to tackle climate 
change amongst right-wing respondents. 
 
These findings are largely consistent with previous US research which has shown that framing 
climate change action around conservative values can engage right-of-centre audiences (e.g., Wolsko 
et al., 2016). Our research here extends this beyond the US to show that narrative reframing can help 
overcome traditional resistance to climate change messages amongst the UK centre-right. This is 
important not only for the UK context, in which political polarisation has been a key feature of 
public debate around climate change, but also has implications for any societal context in which 
political polarisation is evident. The narrative workshop methodology is flexible and context-
specific, grounding narratives in audience values, and is applicable to other cultures and topics 
(Marshall, 2014). In addition, though, the content of the narratives developed here are likely to 
appeal to audiences beyond the UK. For example, we would expect the Waste narrative to be 
relevant in many other developed countries, particularly at a time when economic policies of 
‘austerity’ are dominant. Furthermore, the ethic of frugality, which has a long tradition in Western 
philosophy (Xenos, submitted), has been found previously to resonate widely amongst the public, 
including amongst those who otherwise have little interest in environmental issues (Evans & 
Abrahamse, 2008). This suggests fertile ground for public engagement with sustainable lifestyles and 
environmental policies without recourse to an overtly ‘pro-environmental’ argument.   
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The current study was conducted shortly before the referendum in the UK regarding membership of 
the European Union, the environmental policy implications of which are currently unclear, although 
the government reaffirmed its commitment to tackling climate change in the recent Fifth Carbon 
Budget. In any case, we would not expect political polarisation in respect of climate change, which is 
grounded in fundamental values and worldviews, to be significantly affected by the vote or the UK’s 
departure from the EU (Goren, 2005): the result of the referendum itself, and wider global trends 
with regards to political populism, suggest that understanding and finding ways of managing political 
polarisation is an extremely timely goal.   
 
We have also provided some insight into why certain concepts and themes are more effective as well 
as those narrative elements which are less effective and might serve to further disengage audiences. 
In particular, Study 1 showed that actual or implied message source was a key condition for 
acceptance. Consistent with this, we found that the health and economic framings were not always 
accepted, despite indications from US research that they can serve as effective climate change frames 
(Myers et al., 2012; Bain et al., 2012), because of a distrusted (perceived outgroup or self-interested) 
source or the perception of hyperbolic statistical claims. This is consistent with dominant persuasion 
and communication theories which posit that ‘messenger’ is at least as important as ‘message’ in 
determining how a particular communication is received (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and with 
previous climate change communication research that shows identification with message source as a 
key determinant of attitude change (Wolsko et al., 2016; cf. Kahan et al., 2011).   
 
While we observed (small) consistent effects on judgments of the acceptability of the narratives (i.e., 
agreement and reactance), in common with many other message-framing experiments, evidence of 
changes in underlying beliefs about and responses to climate change was less clear. The cluster of 
questions used to capture reactance to the narratives in Study 2 showed that all of the experimental 
conditions produced an elevated sense of exaggeration or hyperbole among right-leaning 
participants, relative to the control condition. This is consistent with previous research that has 
observed a ‘backfire’ effect: Gromet et al. (2013) found that, relative to the absence of a message, 
pro-environmental messages tended to impact negatively on the attitudes and behaviours of 
conservative participants. The findings also echo several recent studies which have failed to observe 
any consistent impact in terms of attitude change as a result of differentially framed messages 
(McCright et al, 2015; Bernauer & McGrath, 2016). This has been explained in terms of the ‘pre-
treatment environment’ (i.e., everyday contact with climate change messages) which have a much 
stronger influence on participants’ climate change attitudes than a brief experimental manipulation 
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(Bernauer & McGrath, 2016). Taken together, the evidence suggests that engaging centre-right 
audiences – even with the most effective language – is not straightforward. Future research might 
explore whether avoiding any mention of climate change in the narratives might produce more 
pronounced attitudinal effects. We were interested in how framing might shape support for climate 
change policy and lifestyle change, the former requiring some explicit mention of the issue. 
Communicating efforts aimed at fostering low-carbon lifestyles alone, however, might well be more 
persuasive if co-benefits (to health, community cohesion, etc.) are emphasised over environmental 
benefits (cf. Bain et al., 2012).  
 
However, we caution against undue pessimism. A strength of the current study is that the narratives 
were explored using mixed-methods research. Most framing research, on the other hand, involves a 
process of truncated and ‘one way’ communication: participants are exposed to messages that differ 
in relatively minor ways. Our findings – synthesising across both studies reported here – suggest that 
while there are no ‘magic words’ that can overcome deep-rooted cynicism or disinterest, people have 
clear preferences for different narratives. The value of deploying these different linguistic 
frameworks in communication is as more or less effective tools for beginning a conversation, not 
necessarily for ‘winning an argument’. Starting a conversation with someone on terms they are 
comfortable with is the first step to building – and sustaining – their engagement. This suggests that 
the insights gained from these studies should be applied in participatory, dialogic contexts, where 
more substantive levels of engagement are likely to be engendered in a genuinely conversational 
setting, and defensive reactions to explicitly persuasive communications are less likely (cf. Max-
Neef, 1991). 
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Appendices 
	
1 Study 1 narrative texts 
	
Narrative 1: Avoiding waste is common sense 
No-one likes to see things go to waste: it’s just common sense. If you bring your kids up well, you teach them 
that it is irresponsible to waste things - to finish their dinner and not throw away food, and to turn off lights 
in rooms when they are not using them. But millions of us live in old houses filled with gaps and holes that 
are draughty in the winter – we’re literally throwing energy away. Insulating them means we get warmer 
homes that are cosier, more comfortable to live in and better for our health. That’s what energy efficiency is 
about: who can argue with the idea of doing more with less? Conserving energy is a conservative thing to 
do. It is lovely if you live in a neighbourhood where there is hardly any litter. More and more people are 
composting their food waste, and almost everything the council pick up from people’s houses is recycled. It 
feels like we are really getting somewhere with packaging and recycling. So then it doesn’t make sense when 
you see offices across the city with their lights on, wasting electricity. It’s no better than fly tipping, wasting 
energy when you don’t need to. It’s our energy – so it’s only fair that we should all use it responsibly, and 
not waste it for no good reason. 
 
Narrative 2: Health & quality of life 
Any sensible person can’t help but be troubled by the condition of the pavements, vandalism and crime, litter 
and the cleanliness of the air we breathe. These are all environmental issues that affect our quality of life, 
and climate change is exactly the same. The winter floods in 2013/14 destroyed billions of pounds of 
property. Homes that people had worked hard and saved for all their lives were ruined. Taking practical 
steps to keep these threats at bay is a sensible response. Doctors and the British Medical Association tell us 
that unchecked climate change will increase asthma, heatstroke and allergies, with serious impacts on the 
health of the youngest and oldest people. Using cleaner forms of energy such as solar and wind power to 
control our carbon emissions will reduce air and water pollution. And cleaner air saves lives. Poorly 
insulated homes are making life miserable for elderly people who have worked hard all their lives, and don’t 
deserve to spend their later years in cold or damp conditions. Every winter 10,000 people die in the UK 
because they live in a cold home – that’s more than die from drugs, car accidents or alcohol-related 
diseases. So getting to grips with our leaky houses is really about improving our quality of life –and saving 
the lives of people who deserve better. 
 
Narrative 3: Great British Energy 
No one really wants to live next door to a wind turbine. But ask yourself this: would you rather live next door 
to a wind turbine or a fracking well? Local democracy is the backbone of Britain, so decisions about energy 
technologies should be taken by local communities. We have to make the right choices to preserve the 
landscape and countryside of Britain for our children and grandchildren, as well as the millions of people 
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who live and work in the countryside right now. Over the years, we have cleaned up our rivers, banished 
smog from our cities, and protected our forests. But climate change poses even greater dangers: more 
frequent and extreme flooding causing damage to our homes and livelihoods, disruption to seasonal 
changes, and the wildlife which depends on them. Perhaps we cannot be completely self-sufficient, but we 
can do a lot better at producing our own energy, through community-owned solar and wind projects. We 
need to learn from places like Germany that are way out in front on this. They’ve got hundreds of small 
energy enterprises where people share in the profits and have a real sense of pride, ownership and 
responsibility. There’s no reason we couldn’t do the same. Clean energy technologies are a golden 
opportunity to rebuild our manufacturing base – Great British Energy that will provide jobs for thousands, 
represent a sound investment in the future, and ensure that we leave a strong legacy for future generations. 
 
Narrative 4: The Smart Money 
Sometimes people talk about wind or solar as ‘alternative’ technologies. But they’re not any more: they are 
very much part of the mainstream. Investment in clean energy has exploded – more than $1,462 billion since 
the start of 2010, and the world is adding more capacity in renewable power each year than coal, gas and 
oil combined. The price of renewables is falling dramatically: the smart money is in the clean energy sector. 
That’s why calls for ‘divestment’ and taking money out of the fossil fuel industry have struck a chord. We 
shouldn’t demonise a sector that has done so much for billions of people’s living standards, but we need to 
recognise that the future lies in renewable technologies like solar and wind, not in the fossil fuels of the 20th 
century. The short-term costs associated with creating a lean, green economy will deliver longterm benefits 
for everyone. Insulating properties now (and making them more efficient) will cut down the amount of 
wasted energy, and put money in people’s pockets. It’s good business-sense, which is why more and more 
big businesses ‘get it’. Ikea, Unilever, Marks & Spencers are all taking climate change and sustainability 
very, very seriously – because it is a serious issue. Just like a sound investment strategy, a responsible, long-
term energy policy demands a willingness to take decisions today for the good of tomorrow. And a reliable, 
resilient energy system will power the economy. 
 
 
2 Study 2 narrative texts 
 
‘Waste’ narrative: 
"No-one likes to see things go to waste: it’s just common sense. You bring your kids up to think that it’s 
irresponsible to waste things - to finish their dinner and not throw away food, and to turn off appliances 
when they’re not using them. Millions of people live in old houses filled with gaps and holes that are 
drafty in the winter – we’re effectively throwing energy away.       
To me, tackling climate change is about avoiding waste, conserving energy, and finding a way of doing 
more with less – that’s something that’s important to me.      
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That’s why I agree that the government should sign up to an international agreement to tackle climate 
change, and I think the people of Britain have a role to play in making changes to our own lifestyles to 
reduce our impact on the environment. We all have a responsibility to not be wasteful with the 
resources we have."       
  
‘Great British Energy’ narrative: 
"Democracy is the backbone of Britain, so decisions about energy technologies should be taken by the 
British people. We have to make the right choices for our children and grandchildren, and invest in 
clean energy technologies, which are a golden opportunity to rebuild our manufacturing base. Perhaps 
we cannot be completely self-sufficient, but we can do a lot better at producing our own energy, through 
British-made solar and wind technologies.       
To me, tackling climate change is about supporting British manufacturing and technology, and creating 
more green jobs - that’s something that is important to me.      
That’s why I agree that the government should sign up to an international agreement to tackle climate 
change, and I think the people of Britain have a role to play in making changes to our own lifestyles to 
reduce our impact on the environment. Great British Energy based on clean energy is a sound 
investment in the future." 
 
‘Justice’ narrative: 
"The poorest people in the world are the ones who will suffer the most from the impacts of climate 
change, but they’ve done the least to cause it. We need to take a look at ourselves and realise that our 
way-of-life isn’t sustainable. It’s only fair that those with more resources do more to tackle climate 
change and help those who are more vulnerable avoid the worst of the impacts.  
To me, tackling climate change is about justice and putting pressure on governments to help the poorest 
people survive climate chaos - that’s something that is important to me.  
That’s why I agree that the government should sign up to an international agreement to tackle climate 
change, and I think the people of Britain have a role to play in making changes to our own lifestyles to 
reduce our impact on the environment. Climate justice means those who are more responsible for 
causing climate change doing more to tackle it." 
	
	
3 Manipulation check for Study 2 
	
As a manipulation check, participants were asked which of five statements was mentioned in the 
article they had read. The Table below shows that the majority of respondents correctly identified 
the relevant statement. Chi-square analysis confirms a significant difference between conditions X
2 
(12, 2087) = 3137.05, p<0.001. 
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Experimental condition 
 
  
Waste British Justice Control Total 
Millions of people live in drafty 
old homes in this country 
N 338 27 27 11 403 
% of condition 64.00% 5.30% 5.20% 2.10% 19.30% 
We have an opportunity to rebuild 
our manufacturing base 
N 33 324 25 16 398 
% of condition 6.20% 63.50% 4.80% 3.00% 19.10% 
Poor people will suffer most from 
climate impacts 
N 130 138 447 38 753 
% of condition 24.60% 27.10% 85.30% 7.20% 36.10% 
Many new cars have a puncture 
repair kit 
N 10 5 11 444 470 
% of condition 1.90% 1.00% 2.10% 84.40% 22.50% 
Most people do not bother to 
spring clean their homes 
N 17 16 14 17 64 
% of condition 3.20% 3.10% 2.70% 3.20% 3.10% 
Total 
N 528 510 524 526 2088 
% of condition 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
4  Study 2 regression analyses for responses to narratives and climate change perceptions/responses (significant predictors in bold) 
         
 
 Article agreement  Article reactance  Climate change concern  Risk perception 
Model Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Sig. 
(Constant) (R
2
) 
 
4.75 0.00 
 
9.84 0.00 
 
7.02 0.00 
 
10.68 0.00 0.00 
Gender (male) 
1 
(.03*) -0.02 -0.82 0.42 
1 
(.04*) 0.05 2.25 0.03 
1 
(.03*) -0.06 -2.99 0.00 
1 
(.03*) -0.04 -2.29 0.02 0.01 
Age_25-34 0.02 0.80 0.43  -0.01 -0.51 0.61  -0.05 -1.64 0.10  -0.01 -0.27 0.79 0.30 
Age_35-44 0.03 1.14 0.26  -0.03 -0.96 0.34  -0.04 -1.53 0.13  -0.01 -0.31 0.76 0.32 
Age_45-54 0.01 0.23 0.82  -0.04 -1.54 0.12  -0.09 -3.15 0.00  -0.05 -1.84 0.07 0.31 
Age_55-64 0.04 1.51 0.13  -0.05 -1.78 0.08  -0.09 -2.93 0.00  0.00 0.06 0.95 0.75 
Age_65+ 0.07 2.37 0.02  -0.08 -2.36 0.02  -0.08 -2.54 0.01  -0.02 -0.79 0.43 0.04 
Location_England 0.08 1.36 0.18  -0.08 -1.23 0.22  -0.08 -1.28 0.20  0.04 0.63 0.53 0.55 
Location_Wales 0.04 1.12 0.26  -0.03 -0.74 0.46  -0.04 -0.95 0.34  0.03 0.79 0.43 0.96 
Location_Scotland 0.07 1.20 0.23  -0.07 -1.17 0.24  -0.07 -1.21 0.23  0.05 1.01 0.31 0.68 
Ethnicity_black 0.02 0.63 0.53  -0.04 -1.46 0.14  -0.04 -1.40 0.16  -0.03 -1.32 0.19 0.72 
Ethnicity_white -0.04 -0.97 0.33  -0.01 -0.32 0.75  -0.06 -1.50 0.13  -0.05 -1.50 0.14 0.50 
Ethnicity_asian -0.02 -0.54 0.59  0.02 0.55 0.58  -0.04 -1.12 0.27  -0.01 -0.48 0.63 0.06 
Education_gcse -0.07 -1.73 0.08  -0.01 -0.30 0.77  0.04 0.89 0.37  -0.10 -2.83 0.01 0.02 
Education_alevel -0.07 -1.58 0.12  0.00 0.03 0.98  0.02 0.49 0.62  -0.06 -1.64 0.10 0.09 
Education_vocational -0.03 -0.87 0.39  -0.03 -0.63 0.53  0.04 0.93 0.35  -0.08 -2.22 0.03 0.07 
Education_undergrad -0.07 -1.51 0.13  -0.04 -0.87 0.38  0.04 0.73 0.47  -0.13 -3.08 0.00 0.03 
Education_postgrad 0.01 0.19 0.85  -0.03 -0.81 0.42  0.05 1.15 0.25  -0.07 -1.97 0.05 0.26 
Rurality_suburban 0.02 0.93 0.36  -0.07 -3.19 0.00  -0.05 -2.08 0.04  -0.04 -2.07 0.04 0.06 
Rurality_rural -0.01 -0.35 0.73  -0.04 -1.64 0.10  -0.07 -3.07 0.00  -0.05 -2.77 0.01 0.01 
Condition_waste 2 
(.04*) 
0.37 5.77 0.00 2 
(.07*) 
-0.02 -0.26 0.80 2 
(.03) 
0.04 0.63 0.53 2 
(.04) 
-0.04 -0.66 0.51 0.75 
Condition_British 0.39 5.93 0.00 0.04 0.63 0.53 -0.08 -1.17 0.24 -0.06 -1.07 0.28 0.85 
Condition_Justice 0.50 7.81 0.00 -0.13 -1.96 0.05 0.03 0.49 0.63 -0.03 -0.44 0.66 0.41 
Pro-env. identity 3 
(.31*) 
0.47 23.66 0.00 3 
(.22*) 
-0.32 -15.19 0.00 3 
(.21*) 
0.40 18.90 0.00 3 
(.44*) 
0.58 32.42 0.00 0.00 
Individualism -0.12 -5.93 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.32 -0.05 -2.37 0.02 -0.13 -7.11 0.00 0.00 
Hierarchism -0.08 -3.39 0.00 0.13 5.49 0.00 -0.04 -1.56 0.12 -0.08 -4.09 0.00 0.00 
Politics_conservative 4 
(.31) 
0.04 0.80 0.42 4 (.22) 0.02 0.33 0.74 4 (.21) -0.11 -1.95 0.05 4 
(.44) 
0.05 1.07 0.29 0.07 
Politics_labour 0.06 1.15 0.25 0.06 1.06 0.29 -0.05 -0.97 0.33 0.08 1.76 0.08 0.00 
Politics_libdem 0.04 1.20 0.23 -0.02 -0.43 0.67 -0.05 -1.33 0.18 0.05 1.80 0.07 0.01 
Politics_snp 0.05 1.66 0.10 0.01 0.28 0.78 0.01 0.42 0.68 0.04 1.51 0.13 0.06 
Politics_ukip 0.01 0.18 0.86 0.03 0.81 0.42 -0.07 -1.62 0.10 0.02 0.43 0.67 0.20 
Politics_green 0.00 -0.10 0.92 0.02 0.82 0.41 -0.03 -0.90 0.37 0.04 1.43 0.15 0.01 
Political ideology (PI) 
5 
(.31) 0.18 4.30 0.00 
5 
(.23*) -0.05 -1.08 0.28 
5 
(.21) -0.03 -0.62 0.54 
5 
(.44) -0.06 -1.62 0.11 0.45 
Waste x PI 6 
(.33*) 
-0.24 -3.70 0.00 6 
(.24*) 
0.19 2.73 0.01 6 
(.21) 
-0.03 -0.45 0.65 6 
(.44) 
0.06 0.97 0.33 0.99 
British x PI -0.30 -4.51 0.00 0.14 1.98 0.05 0.10 1.41 0.16 0.11 1.82 0.07 0.78 
Justice x PI -0.46 -6.99 0.00 0.34 4.92 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 0.92 0.01 0.15 0.88 0.58 
 
   Climate scepticism  Support gov’t action  Support lifestyle change  Willingness to act 
 
Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. Model 
(R
2
) 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  
 
12.63 0.00 
 
8.47 0.00 
 
9.04 0.00 
 
6.62 0.00 
Gender (male) 
 1 
(.04*) 0.02 1.28 0.20 
1 
(.02*) 0.01 0.59 0.56 
1 
(.04*) -0.06 -3.10 0.00 
1 
(.04*) -0.04 -2.48 0.01 
Age_25-34  0.02 0.96 0.34  0.00 -0.17 0.87  0.01 0.45 0.66  0.02 1.04 0.30 
Age_35-44  -0.01 -0.23 0.82  0.03 1.00 0.32  0.03 1.01 0.31  0.02 0.99 0.32 
Age_45-54  0.01 0.39 0.70  -0.03 -1.14 0.26  -0.01 -0.34 0.73  -0.02 -1.02 0.31 
Age_55-64  -0.01 -0.48 0.63  0.02 0.85 0.40  0.04 1.49 0.14  -0.01 -0.32 0.75 
Age_65+  0.01 0.49 0.62  0.02 0.58 0.56  0.03 0.91 0.36  -0.05 -2.05 0.04 
Location_England  -0.02 -0.42 0.67  0.02 0.33 0.74  0.06 1.04 0.30  -0.03 -0.60 0.55 
Location_Wales  0.00 -0.06 0.95  0.02 0.49 0.63  0.05 1.28 0.20  0.00 -0.05 0.96 
Location_Scotland  -0.01 -0.14 0.89  0.00 -0.07 0.95  0.03 0.48 0.63  -0.02 -0.42 0.68 
Ethnicity_black  -0.01 -0.22 0.83  -0.02 -0.66 0.51  -0.02 -0.78 0.44  0.01 0.36 0.72 
Ethnicity_white  -0.02 -0.73 0.47  -0.01 -0.39 0.70  0.01 0.36 0.72  0.02 0.68 0.50 
Ethnicity_asian  0.02 0.61 0.55  -0.01 -0.34 0.74  0.02 0.62 0.53  0.05 1.86 0.06 
Education_gcse  0.06 1.53 0.13  -0.06 -1.48 0.14  -0.06 -1.64 0.10  -0.08 -2.43 0.02 
Education_alevel  0.02 0.59 0.55  0.01 0.13 0.89  0.00 -0.04 0.97  -0.06 -1.72 0.09 
Education_vocational  0.03 0.91 0.36  -0.04 -1.06 0.29  -0.04 -1.14 0.26  -0.06 -1.84 0.07 
Education_undergrad  -0.01 -0.25 0.80  -0.05 -1.20 0.23  -0.07 -1.48 0.14  -0.09 -2.13 0.03 
Education_postgrad  0.00 -0.06 0.95  -0.03 -0.73 0.47  -0.03 -0.75 0.45  -0.04 -1.14 0.26 
Rurality_suburban  -0.01 -0.66 0.51  0.00 0.05 0.96  -0.01 -0.51 0.61  -0.03 -1.91 0.06 
Rurality_rural  0.03 1.30 0.19  -0.02 -0.92 0.36  -0.04 -1.74 0.08  -0.05 -2.56 0.01 
Condition_waste 
  2 
(.05) 0.05 0.86 0.39 
2 
(.03) 0.03 0.48 0.63 
2 
(.04) -0.07 -1.16 0.25 
2 
(.04) 0.02 0.33 0.75 
Condition_British  -0.05 -0.89 0.38  0.04 0.68 0.50  -0.14 -2.30 0.02  0.01 0.19 0.85 
Condition_Justice  -0.05 -0.90 0.37  0.10 1.63 0.10  0.00 -0.03 0.98  0.04 0.82 0.41 
Pro-env. identity 
  3 
(.45*) -0.52 -29.30 0.00 
3 
(.39*) 0.51 27.53 0.00 
3 
(.39*) 0.53 28.16 0.00 
3 
(.51*) 0.63 37.60 0.00 
Individualism  0.06 3.41 0.00  -0.16 -8.68 0.00  -0.14 -7.56 0.00  -0.12 -6.97 0.00 
Hierarchism  0.21 10.74 0.00  -0.14 -6.78 0.00  -0.11 -5.34 0.00  -0.08 -4.02 0.00 
Politics_conservative 
  4 
(.46) 0.04 0.86 0.39 
4 
(.40*) 0.06 1.34 0.18 
4 
(.39) 0.10 2.06 0.04 
4 
(.51*) 0.08 1.79 0.07 
Politics_labour  -0.01 -0.12 0.90  0.10 2.17 0.03  0.08 1.63 0.10  0.13 3.11 0.00 
Politics_libdem  -0.04 -1.33 0.19  0.08 2.66 0.01  0.05 1.72 0.09  0.07 2.61 0.01 
Politics_snp  -0.03 -1.04 0.30  0.07 2.47 0.01  0.08 2.70 0.01  0.05 1.87 0.06 
Politics_ukip  0.01 0.40 0.69  -0.01 -0.18 0.86  0.04 1.16 0.25  0.04 1.29 0.20 
Politics_green  -0.01 -0.27 0.78  0.03 1.35 0.18  0.03 1.36 0.17  0.06 2.70 0.01 
Political ideology (PI) 
  5 
(.46) 0.07 2.04 0.04 
5 
(.40) 0.00 -0.03 0.97 
5 
(.39) -0.06 -1.56 0.12 
5 (.51) 
-0.03 -0.76 0.45 
Waste x PI 
  6 
(.46) -0.06 -0.99 0.32 
6 
(.40) -0.05 -0.78 0.44 
6 
(.39*) 0.09 1.40 0.16 
6 
(.51) 0.00 0.01 0.99 
British x PI  0.05 0.90 0.37  -0.02 -0.33 0.75  0.18 2.84 0.01  0.02 0.28 0.78 
Justice x PI  0.07 1.17 0.24  -0.09 -1.43 0.15  -0.03 -0.45 0.65  -0.03 -0.56 0.58 
*F Change p<.001  
